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Abstract This paper explores the impact of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and the ensuing financial integration on Euro Area (EA) macroeconomic
imbalances. It is found that EMU caused an exceptional deterioration of current
account positions in relatively unequal EA countries more than in the others. The
explanation provided is that the large increase in money supply following the
abolition of capital controls in 1990, of exchange rate risks in 1999 and the parallel
softening of domestic credit market regulation throughout the 1990s that lead to
downwards interest rate convergence had the effect of relaxing collateral constraints
specifically for lower-income households, whose share is found to rise with levels of
income inequality. Optimistic expectations about future income led to over-bor-
rowing by these groups. Consequently, current account reversal was asymmetric
because the crisis forced indebted lower-income (unskilled) households to abruptly
reduce consumption, as they were the first to be pulled out of the labour market and
hardly had financial buffers. The hypothesis is tested using a difference-in-differ-
ence approach to panel data.
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The period following the introduction of the single currency left the Euro Area (EA)
divided into a periphery with significant current account deficits and a core with
equally substantial current account surpluses. While the former started reversing as
of 2011 in the midst of the Euro crisis, the latter did not go through a symmetric
adjustment (for empirical evidence, see for example Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011).
This paper identifies a common explanation for both the build-up and the
asymmetric reversal of macroeconomic imbalances in the EA. Focus is on the
behavior of the private sector, and more specifically on the drivers of debt-financed
household consumption and the way in which (over)-borrowing might have been
distributed across categories of income in each country.
The debate on the origins of EA imbalances and the mechanism through which
they have been unwinding in the periphery and not in the core is not fully settled.
Some support the competitiveness hypothesis, according to which imbalances relate
to differences in cost competitiveness between the core and the periphery that have
come to light following the loss of the exchange rate as a policy instrument
(Zemanek et al. 2009; Belke and Dreger 2013). Others stress the role played by
capital flows. In this case, imbalances reflect the fact that excess savings in the high-
income core of Europe moved to the low-income periphery following the abolition
of capital controls in the European Single Market (ESM) as of 1990 and the
subsequent elimination of exchange rate risks starting with 1999. This downhill flow
of capital is justified both on the supply and the demand side. Credit supply by core
countries is driven by the expected rate of return (Abiad et al. 2007; Giavazzi and
Spaventa 2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 2010; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011).
Credit demand in poorer peripheral countries stems from the fact that households
get indebted to increase current consumption, for example, because they become
optimistic about future income as in standard inter-temporal consumption models
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Fagan and Gaspar 2007a, b).1
Both hypotheses have limits. The competitiveness hypothesis does not account
for the decoupling of export performance and standard cost competitiveness
indicators, e.g. unit labour costs (ULC) or real effective exchange rates (REER)
deflated by ULC (Gaulier and Vicard 2012). It is also not necessarily consistent with
the fact that current account reversal in deficit countries was mainly achieved
through a contraction in demand (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011). On the other hand,
the capital-flow hypothesis overestimates the role of per capita income and treats
countries like homogenous blocks, failing to account for the role of household
heterogeneity and in particular for the fact that the propensity to get indebted is
likely to vary along the income distribution. The question of who holds debt is
1 It should be noted that the distinction between the competitiveness and the capital-flow hypothesis is a
bit artificial here as the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. So, for example, criticism of the
competitiveness hypothesis does not necessarily imply that differences in prices and wages do not play a
role. Capital flows into the periphery lead to overheating and an acceleration in wage and price growth
that ultimately hinges on competitiveness. Yet, the distinction between the two hypotheses allows better
identifying the nature of the EMU shock, i.e. whether stemming from competitiveness divergences or
rather from capital mobility and its consequences.
Econ Polit
123
relevant because it determines the macroeconomic consequences of household
indebtedness over the cycle (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012), potentially shedding
light on current account reversal.
The argument we put to the test is that some EA countries imported large
amounts of capital from abroad hence their current account deficits because they
were relatively unequal societies, with a large cohort of lower-income groups that
experienced a sudden relaxation of collateral constraints following EMU-induced
financial integration. They then started over-borrowing against optimistic expec-
tations about future income. The same is not true for less unequal EA countries
where, prior to EMU, collateral constraints had been biting only for a smaller
negligible share of the population.2 The hypothesis is tested with a difference-in-
difference approach to panel data so as to isolate a causal relation between EMU-
induced financial integration and external imbalances. Our perspective is equally
useful to understand the reversal of current account deficits. The crisis and the
ensuing credit constraints forced deleveraging on the same portion of the population
that got indebted in the first place and that had no alternative but to restrain
consumption considering that lower-income (unskilled) workers were the first to be
pulled out of the labour market and hardly had financial buffers.
There is indeed suggestive evidence that there is something about external
positions and income distribution starting with the 1990s. Figure 1 shows the
relation between the current account in proportion to GDP and income inequality for
a group of EA countries including early members plus Greece. Income inequality is
captured by the Gini coefficient, which measures the distance in income between
two random income groups in the population. Values are taken from Solt (2009),
who provides a standardised indicator so as to allow cross-country comparability.
The time frame from 1980 to 2015 is divided in two sub-periods, one before EMU-
induced financial integration from 1980 to 1998, and one after full financial
integration from 1999 up to 2015. The year 1999 is chosen to indicate full financial
integration because this is the time when exchange rate risks are eliminated, thereby
enhancing capital mobility and therewith also downwards interest rate convergence.
Starting income inequality is juxtaposed to the average current account position
over each sub-period. The current account-inequality nexus becomes statistically
significant and negative only under full financial integration. On the other hand,
conditioning the relation between per capita income relative to the US and external
positions on the expected level of financial integration does not deliver equally
strong results arguably because mean per capita income does not allow exploiting
moments in the distribution of income, which is what is expected to drive the results
in our framework.
2 We use income inequality as a proxy of relative poverty. Figure A (in the ‘‘Appendix’’) shows for each
country the relation between a standard measure of income inequality such as the Gini coefficient and the
share of the population that is considered at risk of poverty because her income is lower than 60 percent
of the median disposable income, as in the definition used by the Eurostat (we use the year 2006 because
this is the first year for which the Eurostat provides data for all European countries but France). Clearly,
the two are interrelated. This is also because of the way in which relative poverty is defined, which makes
it a statistic of income distribution. In the statistical analysis, we use the standardised Gini coefficient,
which provides better coverage of both countries and time.
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The link between income inequality and current account positions is not new in
the literature. Kumhof et al. (2012) have shown that greater inequality induces those
that are negatively affected to borrow because of habit persistence, which also leads
to the endogenous development of domestic credit markets. With increasing
openness to international capital markets as well, higher-income groups become
intermediaries of foreign savings, something that allows them to significantly
increase their consumption. Current account deficits are therewith generated. More
similarly to what is done in the present paper, Al-Hussami and Remesal (2012)
introduce heterogeneity in an inter-temporal consumption model and argue that
rising inequality is associated with worse external positions because of the
behaviour of low/middle-income groups, who borrow to emulate the consumption
patterns of high-income groups. They further show that such an outcome is
reinforced in countries with above-average levels of financial liberalization.
Compared to them, we make a different point in that we explore the effects of
EMU-induced financial integration for different income distributions, independently
of the actual dynamics of inequality.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, while
building on the idea that current account deficits in the periphery reflect capital
inflows financing households that try to maximize consumption inter-temporally as,
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Fig. 1 Mean current account and initial inequality a before full financial integration (1980–1998) and
b after full financial integration (1999–2015). Source: Own elaboration based on Ameco and Standardised
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). The sample includes all euro area countries that entered in
the first wave (except Luxembourg) plus Greece
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we depart from a representative-agent framework by assuming that desired private
indebtedness varies depending on initial levels of income, being mostly concen-
trated at the lower end of the income distribution once collateral constraints get
relaxed. This explains why, under EMU, more unequal countries that had a higher
share of lower-income groups had also worse external positions than the others.
Second, differently from both Kumhof et al. (2012) and Al-Hussami and Remesal
(2012), we are not concerned with the dynamic relation between income inequality
and external positions, but with the impact of financial integration for different
income distributions. Third, we stress the role of forward-looking expectations in
driving inter-temporal consumption rather than habit persistence and/or the desire to
emulate wealthier groups. Finally, an additional feature of our framework is that we
use the EMU process to represent an exogenous shock in credit supply differently
from, for example, Kumhof et al. (2012), where liquid credit markets emerge
endogenously from inequality dynamics. We are thus justified in using a difference-
in-difference estimation technique, which together with other elements in the
specification minimises the problem of the endogeneity that may well exist between
financial integration and income inequality.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
macroeconomic imbalances. Section 3 presents stylized facts. Section 4 discusses
the empirical strategy and the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
There is a growing literature looking at the reasons behind the recent build-up of
macroeconomic imbalances in Europe. As divergences became both significant and
persistent starting with the 1990s, the emerging consensus is now that the monetary
union itself played a role in this dynamics.4 We isolate two dominant explanations:
the competitiveness and the capital-flow hypothesis5 integration.
2.1 The competitiveness hypothesis
Supporters of the competitiveness hypothesis argue that the loss of the exchange
rate as a policy instrument brought to light fundamental cross-country differences in
price and cost competitiveness. The general argument is that countries in the core
were competitive already before the single currency was introduced, while countries
in the periphery that relied extensively on devaluation to recoup competitiveness are
found to have suffered from the loss of the exchange rate. This is reflected in the
3 There is recent evidence showing that capital account openness causes income inequality both in the
short- and medium-run (Furceri and Loungani 2015).
4 Interestingly, Hope (2016) uses a synthetic control method to prove that the introduction of EMU was
responsible for the divergence in current account balances among member states in the run-up to the euro
crisis.
5 We avoid offering a thorough theoretical account of sources of macroeconomic imbalances that would
be unrelated to European monetary unification (e.g. twin-deficits hypothesis, demographics, etc.), but
include them as control variables in the econometric exercise that follows.
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strong statistical relationship that some of the literature finds between real exchange
rates and current account balances (Zemanek et al. 2009; Belke and Dreger 2013).
The institutional version of the competitiveness hypothesis alludes to differences in
wage bargaining systems as the main driver of wage and price differentials between
the deficit and surplus countries (Carlin 2013).
The competitiveness hypothesis has been criticised on a number of fronts. For
example, Gros (2011) and Gaulier and Vicard (2012) suggests that unit labour costs
(ULC) are poor predictors of exports. Gabrisch and Staehr (2015) show
convincingly that rising ULC follow from capital inflows rather than being the
cause of current account deficits in peripheral member states. More specifically, the
competitiveness hypothesis is unable to account for the Spanish and the Irish
performance, whose cost competitiveness in the early 1990s improved on the back
of a deteriorating current account balance (Fig. 7 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). Finally,
existing evidence shows that the reversal of current account deficits was mainly
driven by a dramatic drop in domestic demand (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011),
rather than being preceded by a fall in relative prices which fails to confirm that
macroeconomic imbalances solely reflect, possibly with a lag, cross-country
differences in cost competitiveness.
2.2 The capital-flow hypothesis
By definition, macroeconomic imbalances mirror capital flows. Namely, current
account deficit countries are importers of capital, while surplus countries are net
exporters. The reason why some countries become net importers and others
exporters is explained in neoclassical terms with the argument that mobile capital
tends to fly from high-income countries, where the return to investment is lowest, to
low-income countries, where return is highest. This is described as a standard
downhill flow of capital, a process that is fully driven by market dynamics and that
is expected to allow lower-income countries to catch up with the rest of the union
(Abiad et al. 2007; Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 2010;
Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011).
While the downhill-flow-of-capital story focuses on credit supply, the symmetric
argument on the credit demand side is that lower-income countries that join an
integrated economic area borrow from outside to finance consumption in the
expectation that they will be able to pay back their debt in the future. Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2002) and Fagan and Gaspar (2007a, b) have explained private debt
accumulation and current account deficits in the South of Europe by alluding to this
mechanism. Empirically, the evidence is that relative per capita income is an
important determinant of euro area imbalances. Schmitz and Von Hagen (2011)
confirm that differences in per capita income are the main drivers of current account
positions in the EA. Lane and Pels (2012) show that growth expectations of
consumers in the periphery played a key role as in inter-temporal consumption
models, whilst but being over-optimistic.
Whether it is credit supply or demand that is at the centre of the analysis, the
point is that macroeconomic imbalances originate in the capital account with the
main shock coming from financial integration rather than from the loss of the
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exchange rate. This hypothesis is incomplete or not fully satisfactory in a number of
respects. Firstly, as it will be shown in the next section, the evidence indicates that
low-income countries have been importing capital before capital controls were fully
eliminated. Secondly, the capital-flow hypothesis is not sufficiently concerned with
the role of household heterogeneity in each country.- Lebartz (2014) shows, for
example, that the propensity to borrow tends to vary along the income distribution,
being concentrated at the lower end. The section below expands on this point.
2.3 The capital-flow hypothesis revisited
The mere opening up of credit markets seems insufficient to explain the entire debt
cycle in the euro area periphery going from accumulation to abrupt deleveraging.
Financial integration is a necessary condition for explaining current account
divergence in the euro area but it is per se not sufficient. The argument we put to the
test is that the country-specific distribution of income plays a role, with relatively
unequal countries of the EA more likely to borrow from the outside in the face of
financial integration coinciding with downwards interest rate convergence and the
ensuing relaxation of collateral constraints. That is because more unequal countries
are found to have a relative higher share of lower-income groups than less unequal
ones.6 This is relevant to the extent that lower-income groups are the ones that
typically start borrowing once credit constraints are fully relaxed, as supported by
the empirical literature (Lebartz 2014).
The link between income inequality and external positions has been explored
before. Kumhof et al. (2012) show that idiosyncratic shocks to the income
distribution induce affected groups to both domestically and internationally in order
to smooth consumption. The need for well-developed credit markets would thus
arise endogenously. Top earners are likely to act as intermediaries of foreign capital.
This further increases their share of domestic income. This generates the evidence
that more unequal countries tend to have relatively poor external positions. Building
on an inter-temporal consumption model augmented with household heterogeneity,
Al-Hussami and Remesal (2012) argue that rising inequality leads to current
account deterioration because low/middle-income groups borrow to imitate the
consumption patterns of higher-income groups, especially in relatively high levels
of financial liberalization.
Our hypothesis is that financial openness and downwards interest rate conver-
gence during the early 1990s led to strong consumption in more unequal EA
countries because it was associated with a relaxation of collateral constraints for the
large cohort of lower-income groups that populated these countries. Compared with
both Kumhof et al. (2012) and Al-Hussami and Remesal (2012), we are not
concerned with the dynamics of inequality but just with the effect of EMU for
different income distributions. Our perspective would, among others, explain a large
current account deficit in a relatively competitive yet relatively unequal country
such as Ireland. It also helps interpreting the evidence that the correction of current
account deficits was mainly achieved via abrupt demand compression. In fact,
6 See Footnote 4.
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indebted lower-income (unskilled) groups had no alternative but to compress
consumption considering that they were first to be pulled out of the labour market
and had no financial buffers. This generated a standard debt cycle going from boom
to bust in the unequal periphery, yet not necessarily in the core of the monetary
union where EMU did not come as a credit shock as much as it did in the former
group of countries.
3 Stylised facts
3.1 Beyond relative per capita income
The capital-flow hypothesis builds on the idea that differences in relative per capita
income drive the downhill flow of capital inside the EA. The empirical literature
typically finds a statistically significant relationship between relative per capita
income and external positions, with the latter improving in higher levels of per
capita income (Debelle and Faruqee 1996; Chinn and Prasad 2003; Abiad et al.
2007; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 2010; Schmitz and Von Hagen 2011). This seems
to hold true for the EA as well. Nevertheless, when conditioning it on the degree of
financial integration, it seems that the time when capital controls and then exchange
rate risks are fully eliminated is not different from times when financial integration
was less deep.
Figure 2 (upper quadrants) sketches the relationship between per capita income
relative to the US expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) and the current
account balance as a proportion of GDP over 1980–2015. The sample includes all
countries that entered EMU in the first wave plus Greece distinguishing between
two sub-periods, 1980–1998 and 1999–2015. The year of the formal beginning of
EMU is chosen to isolate the beginning of full integration. The suggestive evidence
is that relatively low-income countries tend to have worse external positions than
high-income countries, whether capital markets are partially liberalized as in the
period 1980–1998 or fully liberalized as in 1999–2015. That low-income countries
import capital possibly to engage in inter-temporal consumption thus predates
EMU.
By contrast, a time break characterises the relationship between income
inequality and current account positions. Figure 2 (lower quadrants) displays the
link between the standardized Gini coefficient and the current account over the same
time span. The sample is the same used in the previous figure and the beginning of
financial integration is again set in 1999. In this case, it does matter whether capital
markets are partially or fully liberalized. Prior to full capital mobility, there is no
relation between the distribution of income and the external balance. Yet, this
becomes significant and negatively signed following the opening up of capital
accounts as of 1999, with high inequality associated with worse current account
balances. The evidence is suggestive of a ‘‘special’’ interaction between financial
integration, the shape of the income distribution and current account balances.
Econ Polit
123
3.2 Households’ leverage and financial buffers
At the core of our hypothesis is the idea that, in relatively unequal EA countries, a
large share of the population starts getting indebted for consumption purposes after
gaining easy access to credit during the EMU process. Figure 3a compares mean
household debt-to-income ratios across more and less unequal EA countries
classified as those above and below average inequality respectively. While
household indebtedness was on average higher in less unequal countries for most
part of the 1990s, with the Netherlands in particular driving the results, it rose
significantly in more unequal countries starting from the early 1990s, eventually
overshooting the former group as of 2003. The phenomenon went hand in hand with
an erosion of the net financial assets to income ratio in the more unequal part of the
union as opposed to the less unequal one, which account for a potentially difficult
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Fig. 2 The relation between the current account, relative income, and inequality (1980–2015). Source:
Own elaboration based on AMECO Database, Penn World Tables and Standardised World Income
Inequality Database. The sample includes all euro area countries that entered in the first wave (except
Luxembourg) plus Greece




3.3 Asymmetric reversal and low-skilled employment
The question of ‘‘who holds debt’’ is important because it conditions the
macroeconomic consequences of deleveraging. We explain asymmetric current
account reversal by the fact that the crisis reverted the large credit supply shock
initially associated with EMU. Financial distress meant that credit constraints were
back in place, thereby putting pressure especially on poorer indebted households, as
those that were the first to be pulled out of the labour market when the crisis hit.
Figure 4 plots the evolution of the current balance and of the employment rate for
the lowest-skilled distinguishing between more and less unequal countries. In more
unequal countries, with the massive collapse of employment for the least skilled,
which represents 66% of all the employed, came a drop in consumption that led to a
significant correction in current account deficits. By contrast, the data do not suggest
any significant correlation between low-skilled employment and external positions
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Fig. 3 Gross household debt (a) and net financial assets to income ratios (b) (1995–2015). Source: Own
elaboration based on Eurostat. The sample includes all euro area countries that entered in the first wave
(except Luxembourg) plus Greece. Unequal includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; equal
consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and The Netherlands. The gross debt to income
ratio is defined as debt arising from loans, recorded at the end of each calendar year, to the gross
disposable income of the same year (Eurostat). The net financial assets to income ratio is defined as total




4 Empirical strategy and results
4.1 Baseline specification
To show that the financial integration associated with EMU had a causal effect on
macroeconomic imbalances, we adopt a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to
panel data. The sample includes all countries that entered the first wave, except
Luxembourg, which in many respects is an outlier, plus Greece, a country that
accessed the monetary union in 2011. The sample is divided in two subgroups based
on their income-inequality record immediately prior to full financial integration.
More unequal countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Less
unequal countries are Austria, Belgium Finland, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands (for evidence, see also Fig. 1).8 We take relatively unequal countries
to represent the treatment group, as these are the countries where a significant share
of the population is believed to have been credit-constrained prior to full financial
integration, hence where ‘‘true’’ treatment occurred. The year of treatment is 1999,
which coincides with the beginning of EMU, in particular with the elimination of
exchange risks on top of all other market-based and administrative capital controls
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Fig. 4 The relation between the current account and low skilled employment (1995–2015). Source: Own
elaboration based on Eurostat. The low-skilled employment rate is given by the employment rate of those
with pre-primary and primary education (Eurostat). The sample includes all euro area countries that
entered in the first wave (except Luxembourg) plus Greece. Unequal includes Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain; equal consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and The Netherlands
8 The distinction coincides with that between core and periphery.
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integration and the ensuing downwards interest rate convergence as a change in
share of the population that gets access to credit, an approach that is not unusual in
the literature (see, for example, Landau and Wieladek 2012). By assumption, one
group is exposed to treatment in the second period, from 1999 to 2015, but not in the
first period from 1980 to 1998. The second group is not exposed to treatment during
either period, as if financial integration had no specific impact on access to credit in
the control group because here interest rate levels were generally contained and
collateral constraints had not been biting for anyone.
The baseline specification is as follows:
CAit ¼ a0 þ cEs þ udt þ dðEs  dtÞ þ bCANit þ eit; ð1Þ
where CA is the current account balance as a share of GDP in country i and period t;
E and d capture the treatment group and the second period respectively; E 9 d is the
so-called difference-in-difference estimator; CAN is the current account (CA) norm,
namely the (equilibrium) current account level that should prevail on the basis of
fundamentals; e is the robust error term.
Following the methodology in Salto and Turrini (2010), the CA norm is extracted
from a panel regression of current account balances on factors including the oil
balance, the fiscal policy stance relative to trading partners, the old-age dependency
ratio, real GDP per capita growth, the relative per capita income level and net
foreign assets as a percentage of GDP with standard errors robust with respect to
heteroskedasticity and residual correlation within panels. All variables are
calculated as 4-year non-overlapping averages.9 By including the CA norm, we
are de facto estimating for deviations from ‘‘normal’’ current account positions that
can be attributed to EMU. It should be noted that the inclusion of the CA norm
comes with some significant advantages. First, it is able to explain both the cross-
section and time-series variation in the data such that additional fixed effects are not
necessary. Second, it allows us to opt for a static specification so that no solution has
to be found to account for the fact that the current account is typically exposed to
mean reversion. Third, it justifies the absence of determinants on the supply side in
the specification to the extent that a deviation from the norm means by definition
that the REER is either under- or over-appreciated.
Table 1 reports results from three different estimation techniques. There is
significant (non-linear) heteroscedasticity in the data that warrants the use of robust
error terms, as evident from the outcome of the White’s test based on estimating the
baseline specification by ordinary least square (OLS) (Model 1). Model (2)
addresses the heteroskedastic error structure by clustering errors at the country level.
Model (3) estimates the same specification by feasible generalised least squares
(FGLS). The similarity of the results between Model (2) and Model (3) is guarantee
of the fact that there is no structural misspecification. The difference-in-difference
estimator is significant and negatively signed across the board, which confirms that
the beginning of EMU in 1999 was responsible for a deterioration of the current
account position (or its deviation from equilibrium levels) in more unequal countries
relatively to less unequal ones. Our preferred estimation technique is FGLS because
9 See list of variables in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
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it does not require as many groups as cluster-robust standard errors do and because
it better fits a situation in which all aspects of the model are completely specified,
which is likely to be the case given the inclusion of the CA norm.
4.2 Additional controls
We introduce additional controls. In order to have a more explicit test of the role of
inequality, we include each country’s inequality record in 1999 as measured by the
standardised Gini coefficient, which is our proxy of the share of the population that
was credit-constrained immediately prior to full financial integration. We include it
both as a covariate (Model 1) and in interaction with a dummy for relatively unequal
countries and a time dummy for the period after 1999 (Model 3), where the latter
approach should allow to better capture whether there is something peculiar about
the EMU period. The value of income inequality immediately prior to treatment is
statistically significant with higher levels of inequality associated with worse
external positions after 1999. Additionally, we include real long-term interest rates
both alone (Model 2) and in interaction with the treatment (Model 4) as for income
inequality to control for the fact that the behaviour of more unequal countries is also
driven by the cost of credit (or of perceived risk), which significantly fell for these
countries following the downwards convergence in interest rates induced by the
financial integration process. Looser credit conditions came with a deterioration in
these countries’ external positions, a result that confirms the role of financial
integration and that complements the finding about the importance of starting
Table 1 The causal impact of the EMU process on EA external imbalances (1980–2015)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
OLS Cluster-robust SE FGLS
Treat -1.034* [-1.915] -1.034 [-0.643] -0.0258 [-0.0556]
Post 3.039*** [6.014] 3.039** [3.110] 2.866*** [6.976]
Diff-in-diff -5.921*** [-7.980] -5.921*** [-3.985] -5.733*** [-8.883]
CA norm 0.775*** [7.043] 0.775* [1.854] 0.940*** [8.370]
Constant 0.657** [1.995] 0.657 [0.756] 0.527* [1.944]
Observations 352 352 352
R-squared 0.492 0.492 n.r.
Number of countries 11 11 11
White’s test Chi2(8) = 45.33
Estimation methods: Model 1 = ordinary least squares (OLS); Model 2 = errors clustered at country
level allowing for heteroskedastic error structure; Model (3) = feasible generalised least squares (FGLS)
allowing for heteroskedastic error structure with neither cross-sectional correlation nor autocorrelation
within panels. The use of weights here is based on the quadratic function of the inverse of the error term
of a first-stage OLS. The sample includes all countries that participated in the first wave of EMU (AT,
BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES) plus Greece over 1980–2015
t-statistics in brackets *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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income inequality, which rather captures the size of the population that suddenly
faces looser credit conditions. Model (5) shows indeed both interactions.
5 Robustness checks
Our robustness checks include the choice of alternative time breaks; different
samples to account for possible sampling errors; and the use of an alternative
specification to validate our assumption that EMU-induced financial integration is
exogenous.
5.1 Time breaks
As part of our robustness checks, we have tested for the causal effect of EMU-
induced financial integration assuming that the ‘‘treatment’’ starts already in 1990,
which is when capital controls are formally eliminated in the EU as a whole. One
alternative time break we used is the year 1995 as this is the average time around
which the capital account is significantly liberalised for most prospective EMU
members, as recorded by the so-called Chinn-Ito index, which is a de jure measure
of financial (or capital account) openness.10 The difference-in-difference estimator
remains highly significant in the baseline specification independently of the time
break chosen. Most interestingly, the size of the coefficient increases with time
reaching its peak in 1999, which is likely to reflect the fact that market-based and
administrative controls on capital flows are eliminated progressively and financial
integration can be considered complete with the final elimination of exchange rate
risks (Table 2).
5.2 Potential for sampling errors
We have included Luxembourg in the sample, which we had initially left out
because it is in many respects an outlier. Sign, significance and size of the
coefficients remain all unaltered. We have also identified a completely different
sample that allows us to use the difference-in-difference approach in a more
conventional fashion by testing for the causal relation between financial integration
and imbalances in the most unequal euro area countries compared with a group of
similarly unequal countries that did not go through the same financial shock. To do
so, we extended the analysis to all OECD countries that had above-average
inequality levels over 1980–2015, so as to isolate all countries with allegedly a
higher share of lower-income groups. The group of relatively unequal countries
selected in this way comprises 12 OECD countries, namely Australia, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA.
The assumption is that EA members are subject to treatment in 1999, while the
10 The Chinn-Ito index accounts for the number of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions as
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.




others are not. The evidence based on the Chinn-Ito index is in fact that, while
financial integration is a global phenomenon starting with the 1980s, the level of
capital account openness that EA members achieve during the EMU process is
unparalleled by any other OECD countries (see Fig. 8 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). Table 3
reports the results. The difference-in-difference estimator confirms that the financial
shock associated with EMU caused a deterioration of the external position of EA
countries characterised by high income inequality compared with countries with a
similar distribution of income that did not go through the same shock.
5.3 Exogenous financial-integration shock
EMU is here conceived as a massive credit supply shock allowing access to credit
for categories of income that had been constrained until then. Access to credit is
normally proxied by private credit to GDP. The measure is endogenous and any
estimation that includes it as a simple covariate is likely to produce biased results.
To overcome this problem, we use the Chinn-Ito index which, by being a de jure
Table 2 The role of starting income inequality and credit conditions (1980–2015)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)



































































Observations 352 343 343 343 343
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11
Estimation method: feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) allowing for heteroskedastic error structure
with neither cross-sectional correlation nor autocorrelation within panels. The use of weights here is
based on the quadratic function of the inverse of the error term of a first-stage OLS. The sample includes
all countries that participated in the first wave of EMU (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES) plus
Greece over 1980–2015
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(b) Credit market regulation
Fig. 5 Capital account openness and credit market regulations (1980–2011). Source: Own elaboration
based on Chinn and Ito (2006) and Fraser Institute. The sample includes all euro area countries that
entered in the first wave (except Luxembourg) plus Greece. Unequal includes Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain; equal consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and The Netherlands
Table 3 The causal impact of the EMU process on external imbalances (1980–2015)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
OLS Cluster-robust SE FGLS
Treat 1.898*** [3.944] 1.898 [1.469] 2.243*** [5.569]
Post 0.351 [0.787] 0.351 [0.930] 0.0831 [0.263]
Diff-in-diff -3.156*** [-4.830] -3.156** [-2.893] -3.031*** [-5.288]
CA norm 0.983*** [10.30] 0.983*** [5.063] 0.843*** [9.326]
Constant -1.693*** [-5.529] -1.693*** [-3.216] -1.940*** [-9.270]
Observations 356 356 356
R-squared 0.325 0.325 n.r.
Number of countries 12 12 12
Estimation method: feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) allowing for heteroskedastic error structure
with neither cross-sectional correlation nor autocorrelation within panels. The use of weights here is
based on the quadratic function of the inverse of the error term of a first-stage OLS. Sample: Australia,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA
t-statistics in brackets *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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measure of financial openness, is likely to be exogenous. To account for the parallel
integration of domestic credit markets, we use an indicator for credit market
regulation compiled by the Fraser Institute. Figure 5 provides a snapshot of the
evolution of financial integration with respect to both international and domestic
credit markets across two groups of countries.
Figure 5a shows average capital account openness in more unequal (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) versus less unequal countries (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands) over 1980–2011. Greater values indicate
that a country is more open to cross-border financial transactions. In the early 1990s,
when phase I of EMU kicked in, less unequal countries were relatively open
financial systems so that in fact the regime change of the early 1990s was less
significant for them than for the others. Figure 5b displays differences in credit
market regulations over the same period. The indicator accounts for private versus
government ownership of banks, government borrowing compared with private
borrowing, interest rate controls and the magnitude of negative real interest rates if
present. Greater values signify less regulation. As in the case of capital account
openness, less unequal countries had on average looser credit market regulation than
more unequal countries. The evidence on trends in credit market regulation also
underpins the argument that, when financial integration took place in the early
1990s, some countries enjoyed easier access to credit not only through foreign
markets but also through a less regulated domestic credit market, with domestic
banking systems significantly contributing to credit bubbles (Lane and McQuade
2014.)
In order to test whether renewed access to credit played an important role in
explaining why more unequal euro area countries got indebted and less unequal
ones much less so, we estimate the equation below on the sample of all countries
that accessed the euro area in the first wave plus Greece over the period 1980–2015:
CAit ¼ b0 þ b1CANit þ b2KAit þ b3EMU þ b4KAit  Unequali þ b5KAit
 Unequali  EMU þ eit; ð2Þ
where CA is the current account balance as a share of GDP; CAN is the CA norm
described as above; KA account for capital account openness as measured by the
Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito 2006); KA 9 Unequal is the interaction between
capital account openness and a dummy for relatively unequal countries; KA 9
Unequal 9 EMU interacts capital account openness, a dummy for more unequal
countries and a time dummy for the period after 1999 so as to capture whether
EMU-induced financial integration made a difference. The same estimation is run
substituting capital account openness with a measure for credit market regulation for
a comprehensive assessment of credit conditions in each country.11 For robustness
purposes, results are shown both for fixed and random effects. The outcome from
the Hausman test suggests that both estimations are unbiased.
Table 4 reports the results. While both financial openness and credit market
regulation tend to be positively associated with external positions, the situation
changes under EMU for more unequal countries with higher financial integration
11 For a definition of variables and sources, see ‘‘Appendix’’.
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being associated with a deterioration in the current account, a result that confirms
that these countries were more exposed to the EMU’s regime change than the
others.
6 Conclusions
The first decade of EMU was associated with an unprecedented rise in
macroeconomic imbalances. The crisis led to a correction of current account
deficits but not to a symmetric adjustment of excessive surpluses. We find that the
EMU process itself was responsible for excessive imbalances. Building on the
capital-flow hypothesis, we suggested that the reason behind it revolves around
household indebtedness, with more unequal EA countries prone to borrow more
than the others because here a higher share of the population saw collateral
constraints being softened following EMU-induced financial integration and the
rapid downwards interest rate convergence. The crisis forced deleveraging onto the
Table 4 The causal impact of the EMU process on EA external imbalances depending on financial
regime (1980–2015)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)































Credit market regulation 0.854 [1.431] 0.762***
[3.044]


















Observations 351 173 351 173
R-squared 0.267 0.249





Estimation methods: random- and fixed-effects. The sample includes all countries that participated in the
first wave of EMU (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES) plus Greece over 1980–2015
t-statistics in brackets *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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same portion of the population because indebted lower-income (unskilled)
households were the first to be pulled out of the labour market and hardly had
financial buffers. They deleveraged the hard way by cutting down on consumption,
which led to a significant correction of current account deficits in more unequal EA
countries.
There are of course some caveats. This paper has been mostly concerned with the
demand side of current account imbalances. This is not to deny that imbalances may
be driven by supply-side factors, being the reflection of a country’s export
performance and of the relative resilience of world market shares. We have
addressed the issue by including the current account norm and thus by estimating for
deviations from equilibrium levels, which would imply that real effective exchange
rates and either over- or under-valued.
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Fig. 6 The relation between income inequality and relative poverty, 2006. Source: Own elaboration
based on Eurostat and Standardised World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). The sample includes all
euro area countries that entered in the first wave (except Luxembourg) plus Greece. The at-risk-poverty
rate is the share of the people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfers) below the ar-
risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after
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Fig. 7 Current accounts and ULC-based REER, 1995–2007, EA. Source: Own elaboration based on
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Fig. 8 Capital account openness in EA vs the world 1980–2011. Source: Own elaboration based on
Chinn and Ito (2006). Treatment group = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Control
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